Economists' Models of Learning

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 94, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 241-261

  Sobel, Joel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007988377     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2701     Document Type: Article

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