Learning in games

European Economic Review

Volumn 42, Issue 3-5, 1998, Pages 631-639

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Levine, David ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Consistency; Experiments; Fictitious play; Game theory; Learning in games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039402581     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00011-7     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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