Payoff assessments without probabilities: A simple dynamic model of choice

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 294-309

  Sarin, Rajiv ^a   Vahid, Farshid ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Procedural rationality; payoff assessments without probabilities; learning; maxmin strategies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010977617     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0702     Document Type: Article

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