On cheating in sealed-bid auctions

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 41-54

  Porter, Ryan ^a   Shoham, Yoav ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheating; Game theory; Sealed bid auctions

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; COST ACCOUNTING; DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS; GAME THEORY; KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION; PROBABILITY; SECURITY OF DATA;

BIDDING; FIRST-PRICE AUCTION; ONLINE AUCTIONS; SEALED-BID AUCTIONS;

ONLINE SYSTEMS;

EID: 9544225065     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.006     Document Type: Conference Paper

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