On cheating in sealed-bid auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 76-84

  Porter, Ryan ^a   Shoham, Yoav ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheating; Game theory; Sealed bid auctions

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; MARKETING; ONLINE SYSTEMS;

CHEATING; ONLINE AUCTIONS; SEALED BID AUCTIONS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242456251     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779928.779938     Document Type: Conference Paper

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