Auctions with untrustworthy bidders

Proceedings - IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce, CEC 2003

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 363-369

  Braynov, S ^a   Sandholm, T ^b  

^a the State University of New York   (United States)

^b Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Computer science; Costs; Distributed computing; Internet; Multidimensional systems; Profitability; Protocols; Watches; Yarn

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SCIENCE; COSTS; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INTERNET; INTERNET PROTOCOLS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PROFITABILITY; WATCHES; YARN;

BACKING-UP; CONTROL MECHANISM; DOMINANT STRATEGY; MARKET FAILURES; MULTIDIMENSIONAL SYSTEMS; TRUST MANAGEMENT; VICKREY AUCTION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 50149101946     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/COEC.2003.1210272     Document Type: Conference Paper

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