FICTIONALISM IN METAPHYSICS

Fictionalism In Metaphysics

Volumn , Issue , 2023, Pages 1-354

  Kalderon, Mark Eli ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 85195333152     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
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