A modal fictionalist result

Nous

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 317-346

  Divers, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746173826     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.00158     Document Type: Article

References (33)

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