Modal fictionalism generalized and defended

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 111, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 121-146

  Kim, Seahwa ^a  

^a NONE   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949099783     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1021202427372     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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4. Brock, S. (1993): ‘Modal Fictionalism: A Response to Rosen’, Mind 102(405), 147-150.
5. Divers, J. (1999): ‘A Modal Fictionalist Result’, Nous 33(3), 317-346.
6. Field, H. (1980): Science without Numbers, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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12. Nolan, D. (1997): ‘Three Problems for “Strong" Modal Fictionalism’, Philosophical Studies 87, 259-275.
13. Noonan, H. (1994): ‘In Defence of the Letter of Fictionalism’, Analysis 54(3), 133-139.
14. Parfit, D. (January 1998): ‘Why Anything? Why This?’, London Review of Books, 2-9.
15. Rosen, G. (1990): ‘Modal Fictionalism’, Mind 99(395), 327-354.
16. Rosen, G. (1993): ‘A Problem For Fictionalism About Possible Worlds’, Analysis 53(2), 71-81.
17. Rosen, G. (1995): ‘Modal Fictionalism Fixed’, Analysis 55(2), 67-73.
18. Unger, P. (1984): ‘Minimizing Arbitrariness: Toward a Metaphysics of Infinitely Many Isolated Concrete Worlds’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, 29-51.
19. Vision, G. (1993): ‘Fiction and Fictionalist Reduction’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74, 150-174.