Three problems for "strong" modal fictionalism

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 87, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 259-275

  Nolan, Daniel ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746172340     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004218817629     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Armstrong, D.M. (1989): A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Armstrong, D.M. (1973): Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Brock, S. (1993): 'Modal Fictionalism: A Response to Rosen', Mind 102, 147-150.
4. Davies, M. and Humberstone L. (1980): 'Two Notions of Necessity', Philosophical Studies 38, 1-30.
5. Evans, G. (1979): 'Reference and Contingency', The Monist 62(2), 161-189.
6. Field, H. (1989): Realism, Mathematics and Modality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
7. Lewis, D. (1986): On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
8. Lewis, D. (1978): 'Truth In Fiction', American Philosophical Quarterly 15(1), 37-46.
9. Lycan, W. (1993): 'Armstrong's New Combinatorialist Theory of Modality', in J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. Reinhardt (eds.) Ontology, Causality and Mind, pp. 3-17, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Rosen, G. (1990): 'Modal Fictionalism', Mind 99(395), 327-354.
11. Rosen, G. (1993): 'A Problem for Fictionalism about Possible Worlds', Analysis 53, 71-81.