Dividend payments as a response to peer influence

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 131, Issue 3, 2019, Pages 549-570

  Grennan, Jillian ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Announcement returns; Dividends; Payout; Peer effects; Repurchases

Indexed keywords

EID: 85054538483     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.01.012     Document Type: Article

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