The effect of ownership concentration and composition on dividends: Evidence from Latin America

Emerging Markets Review

Volumn 30, Issue , 2017, Pages 1-18

  Gonzalez, Maximiliano ^a   Molina, Carlos A ^b   Pablo, Eduardo ^c   Rosso, John W ^d,e  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LA SABANA   (Colombia)

^b IESA   (Venezuela)

^c MINNESOTA STATE UNIVERSITY MOORHEAD   (United States)

^d UNIVERSIDAD PEDAGÓGICA Y TECNOLÓGICA DE COLOMBIA   (Colombia)

^e UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Dividends; International corporate governance; Ownership concentration

Indexed keywords

EID: 84994772437     PISSN: 15660141     EISSN: 18736173     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2016.08.018     Document Type: Article

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