Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge

Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-404

  Audi, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

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EID: 85071609976     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203846469     Document Type: Book

References (134)

1. Alston, William P., Epistemic Justification, Ithaca, 1989. A collection of papers centering on justification and knowledge in a way that unites internalist and externalist elements. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, and 7-11.
2. Alston, William P., Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca, 1991. A major study in religious epistemology, also containing much general epistemology, particularly in the theory of perception. Highly relevant to Chapters 1, 2, and 12.
3. Alston, William P., Beyond "Justification," Ithaca, 2005. An account of the various elements a sound epistemology should take into account. Relevant especially to Chapters 1, 2, and 11.
4. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. by G.R.G. Mure, Oxford, 1928. A major text of immense influence. Especially relevant to Chapter 9.
5. Armstrong, D.M., Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge, 1973. A wide-ranging epistemological essay influential in the reliabilist tradition. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1-3 and 9-11.
6. Audi, Robert, The Structure of Justification, Cambridge and New York, 1993. A collection of papers covering (and often clarifying) most of the topics in Chapters 4, 6-8, and 10-14.
7. Audi, Robert, The Architecture of Reason, Oxford and New York, 2001. A comprehensive theory of rationality, practical as well as theoretical; explicates in detail the nature of justification by comparison with rationality; offers an account of the role of experience in grounding both; and applies some of its epistemological results to the foundations of ethics. Particularly relevant to Chapters 1, 4, 10, and 12.
8. Audi, Robert, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value, Princeton, A statement and defense of an intuitionist ethics, with much discussion of intuition, self-evidence, and moral knowledge. Relevant mainly to Chapters 5, 6, 10, and 12.
9. Aune, Bruce, Knowledge of the External World, London, 1991. A historically oriented, integrated treatment of empirical knowledge. Bears particularly on Chapters 1, 2, 10, and 11.
10. Austin, J.L., Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford, 1979 (reprint). A study of perception particularly pertinent to the appraisal of sense-datum theory and of relevance to understanding foundationalism. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, and 9.
11. Ayer, A.J., The Problem of Knowledge, Harmondsworth, 1956. An epistemological survey in the empiricist tradition. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, 8, 10, and 11.
12. Bergmann, Michael, Justification without Awareness, Oxford and New York, 2006. This book defends an externalist theory of justification with intensive scrutiny of internalist awareness conditions for justification and a development of a properfunction view of justification and knowledge. Highly relevant to Chapters 11 and 12.
13. Berkeley, George, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, New York, 1929 (originally published in 1710). Perhaps the most important statement of phenomenalism, and of an idealist world view in general, in the empiricist tradition. Bears particularly on Chapters 1-3, 8, 9, and 10.
14. Bernecker, Sven, Memory: A Philosophical Study, Oxford and New York, 2009. A detailed presentation of a theory of memory and its role in knowledge and justification. Highly relevant to Chapters 3, 10, and 11.
15. Boghossian, Paul and Peacocke, Christopher (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford and New York, 2000. A collection of professional papers on epistemological, metaphysical, and logical and semantic aspects of the a priori, with an introduction by the editors and separate chapters by each. Pertinent above all to Chapters 4-5.
16. Bon Jour, Laurence, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA, 1985. A detailed and widely discussed statement and defense of coherentism regarding empirical knowledge. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, 8, 9, and 10.
17. Bon Jour, Laurence, In Defense of Pure Reason, Cambridge and New York, 1998. An account of a priori justification and knowledge, with detailed critical discussions of Kant's position on them and of Hume on induction. Highly pertinent to Chapters 5, 6, and 10.
18. Bon Jour, Laurence, Epistemology: Classical Problems and Contemporary Responses, 2nd edn, Lanham, MD, 2009. An introductory book covering most (though not all) of the major topics treated in this book and defending a different though overlapping view of perceptual justification.
19. Brandt, R.B. and Nagel, Ernest (eds.), Meaning and Knowledge, New York, 1965. A comprhensive, historically informed assembly of classical and recent readings in epistemology. Bears on all the chapters.
20. Butchvarov, Panayot, The Concept of Knowledge, Evanston, IL, 1970. A metaphysically oriented, foundationalist inquiry into the nature of knowledge. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 8-10.
21. Butchvarov, Panayot, Skepticism in Ethics, Bloomington, IN, 1989. A detailed study of the possibility and possible extent of justification and knowledge in ethics. Particularly relevant to Chapters 12-14.
22. Butchvarov, Panayot, Skepticism and the External World, Oxford and New York, 1998. An account of skepticism and its implications for a realist metaphysics, with a distinctive theory of the role of decision in determining the extent of our knowledge. Most closely pertinent to Chapters 11, 13, and 14.
23. Chisholm, R.M., Theory of Knowledge, 2nd and 3rd edns, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, and 1989. A rigorous treatment of many basic topics in the field, and an introduction to Chisholm's own epistemological views. Relevant to each chapter.
24. Chisholm, R.M., The Foundations of Knowing, Minneapolis, 1982. A collection of essays, on topics relevant to each chapter, by one of the major epistemologists of the twentieth century.
25. Chisholm, R.M. and Swartz, Robert (eds.), Empirical Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1973. A large collection of influential epistemological writings. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7-10.
26. Coady, C.A.J., Testimony, Oxford, 1992. A comprehensive, historically wide-ranging treatment of testimony that links it at many points with the philosophy of language and the views of Wittgenstein. Pertinent above all to Chapter 7.
27. Craig, Edward, Knowledge and the State of Nature, Oxford, 1990. A sophisticated but lucid and concrete treatment of the problem of analyzing knowledge, with considerable attention to skepticism and far more on testimony than most general books on epistemology. Particularly relevant to Chapters 7, 11, and 13.
28. Crumley, Jack S., An Introduction to Epistemology, 2nd edn, Petrboro, Ontario, A wide-ranging but concise introduction to both the problems and literature of the field. Pertinent to nearly every chapter.
29. Crumley, Jack S. (ed.), Readings in Epistemology, Mountainview, CA, 1999. A comprehensive collection of mainly contemporary readings in the field, with introductions to each section. Bears on each chapter.
30. Dancy, Jonathan, Sosa, Ernest, and Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd edn, Oxford, 1992. A comprehensive reference work of short, dictionary- and encyclopedia-style articles. Highly pertinent to every chapter.
31. DePaul, Michael R. and Ramsey, William (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, MD, 1998. A collection of papers by philosophers and psychologists on the nature of intuition, with pertinent discussion of recent psychological studies of reasoning. Especially relevant to Chapters 4, 5, and 12 but also useful in understanding philosophical method in general.
32. DeRose, Keith, The Case for Contextualism, Oxford and New York, 2009. A detailed account of contextualism with attention to many variants and a partial theory of the importance of the view for skepticism. Especially relevant to Chapters 11, 13, and 14.
33. DeRose, Keith and Warfield, Ted A. (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, Oxford and New York, 1999. A collection of recent writings that concern skepticism particularly in the context of questions about contextual variables, meaning, self-knowledge, and transmission of justification. Highly pertinent to Chapters 8, 11, 13, and 14.
34. Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, in vol. 2 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothof, and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge, 1984 (originally published in 1641). One of the greatest and most influential works in modern epistemology, and a powerful statement of both rationalism and foundationalism. Bears on every chapter.
35. Dretske, Fred I., Seeing and Knowing, London, 1969. An intensive study of perception and its relation to empirical knowledge, with an influential defense of the notion of non-epistemic seeing. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, and 11-14.
36. Dretske, Fred I., Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA, 1981. A major statement of a reliabilist, information-theoretic account of knowledge. Particularly pertinent to Chapters 1, 8, and 10.
37. Everitt, Nicholas and Fisher, Alec, Modern Epistemology, New York, 1995. A highlevel introductory textbook with special attention to mathematical and logical knowledge and detailed discussions of Quine (a major influence on the authors) and Rorty. Pertinent to most chapters, but especially Chapters 5, 6, and 8.
38. Fales, Evan, A Defense of the Given, Lanham, MD, 1966. A defense of the view that justification is conferred by what is given in immediate experience, with detailed applications to the foundationalism conceived as a plausible theory that makes use of the given. Pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, and 9.
39. Feldman, Richard, Epistemology, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2003. An Introductory treatment relevant mainly to Parts One and Three and especially to Chapters 10 and 11.
40. Fogelin, Robert, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, Oxford and New York, 1994. An intensive and sympathetic inquiry into skepticism, from a distinctively Pyrrhonian point of view. Relevant above all to Chapters 13 and 14.
41. Foley, Richard, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Cambridge, MA, 1987. A detailed development of a subjectivistic theory of justification. Pertinent mainly to Parts Two and Three.
42. Foley, Richard, Working without a Net, Cambridge, MA, 1993. A development and generalization of his theory of epistemic rationality. Especially relevant to Chapters 11-14.
43. Fumerton, Richard A., Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception, Lincoln, NE, 1985. A study of both the nature of the objects of perception and the way perception yields justification and knowledge. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, and 10.
44. Fumerton, Richard A., Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Lanham, MD, 1996. A systematic treatment of skepticism with special reference to the controversies between internalism and eternalism and foundationalism and coherentism. Highly relevant to Chapters 11 and 12-14.
45. Ginet, Carl, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, Dordrecht and Boston, 1975. A rigorous high-level study of these three notions in relation to each other. Particularly relevant to Chapters 1-3 and 11-14.
46. Goldman, Alan H., Empirical Knowledge, Berkeley, CA, 1988. A detailed presentation of a theory of knowledge and evidence with special emphasis on inference to the best explanation. Pertinent above all to Chapters 1 and 9-14.
47. Goldman, Alvin I., Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA, 1986. A presentation of reliabilism for justification and knowledge, with much discussion of related developments in cognitive psychology. Particularly relevant to Chapters 1, 3, 8, 10, and 11.
48. Goldman, Alvin I., Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford and New York, 1999. A wide-ranging treatment of epistemology in the context of social elements in its development, with much discussion of the nature and structure of knowledge in such domains as science, law, and education. Bears on many chapters, particularly 7 and 12.
49. Goldman, Alvin I., Pathways of Knowledge, Oxford and New York, 2002. A concise treatment of a number of the topics treated in this book.
50. Greco, John, Putting Skeptics in Their Place, Cambridge and New York, 2000. An examination of the structure of skeptical arguments which contends that taking account of them requires an externalist epistemology and that a version of virtue epistemology deals best with knowledge and skepticism. Particularly pertinent to Chapters 1, 10, 13, and 14.
51. Greco, John and Sosa, Ernest, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Oxford, 1999. A book of commissioned papers aimed at providing high-level examinations of the current status of major epistemological issues. Pertinent to every chapter.
52. Haack, Susan, Evidence and Inquiry, Oxford, 1993. An attempt to combine the best elements in foundationalism and coherentism, with special attention to the connections between epistemology and philosophy of science. Bears especially on Chapters 8, 9, and 12.
53. Hamlyn, David, Understanding Perception, Aldershot, 1996. A monograph on perception and its relation to belief, learning, consciousness, and other notions important in this book. Highly relevant to Chapters 1, 2, and 4.
54. Harman, Gilbert, Thought, Princeton, NJ, 1975. A broad, influential study of the nature of knowledge, with much attention to defeasibility conditions, inferential transmission of knowledge, and the role of coherence in justification. Bears especially on Chapters 1, 3, and 8-11.
55. Harman, Gilbert, Change in View, Cambridge, MA, 1986. A detailed study of evidence and justification as bearing on changing, as opposed to simply holding, a position, with special emphasis on the conditions for coherence in one's overall view. Especially relevant to Chapters 8-11.
56. Harman, Gilbert, Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind, Oxford and New York, 1999. A collection of papers presenting large-scale conceptions of the a priori, reasoning, and knowledge it helpfully contrasts with the perspectives in Chapters 5, 8, and 9.
57. Hawthorne, John, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford and New York, 2004. A study of the lottery problem and the conditions for the transmission of knowledge, with direct bearing on Chapter 8 and relevance to Chapters 10-14.
58. Heatherington, Stephen Cade, Knowledge Puzzles, Boulder, CO, 1996. A brief but comprehensive introduction to epistemology with emphasis on the puzzles generated by many of its central questions. One or another section bears on any given chapter.
59. Heil, John, Perception and Cognition, Berkeley, CA, 1983. A study of perception in relation to belief, with discussions linking epistemology to philosophy of mind. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 10.
60. Hintikka, Jaakko, Knowledge and Belief, Ithaca, NY, 1962. A rigorous, advanced study in epistemic logic. Particularly relevant to Chapters 8 and 10.
61. Huemer, Michael, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Lanham, MD, 2001. A critical, historically informed analysis of skepticism about perceptual knowledge, with a detailed response in the foundationalist, realist tradition. Highly pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, 9, and 10.
62. Huemer, Michael, Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, London, 2002. A large, wideranging collection of classical and contemporary papers and book selections. It is designed to complement this book and has at least several readings pertinent to every chapter, as well as introductions to each major section by Huemer and useful study questions for each reading.
63. Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, 1888 (originally published in 1739). One of the greatest and most influential works in modern philosophy, and a powerful statement of empiricism. It bears on every chapter.
64. Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Indianapolis, 1977 (first published in 1748). A major work in modern epistemology, particularly for the topics of causation, induction, and skepticism. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, 10, and 11.
65. Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. by Lewis White Beck, New York, 1950 (originally published in 1783). A short presentation of the ideas in Kant's monumental Critique of Pure Reason, one of the greatest texts in modern philosophy. The Prolegomena bears particularly on Chapters 1, 5, 6, 10, and 13.
66. Kitcher, Philip, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, Oxford, 1984. A wide-ranging, historically informed treatment of mathematical knowledge, with a sustained critique of various apriorist conceptions of it and an account of a "defensible empiricism." Particularly relevant to Chapters 4 and 5.
67. Klein, Peter, Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, 1981. A rigorous treatment of the nature of knowledge, certainty, and skepticism. Especially pertinent to Chapters 8 and 10-14.
68. Kvanvig, Jonathan L., The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, Lanham, MD, A detailed statement and critical appraisal of a virtue epistemology, relevant mainly to Chapters 1, 10, and 11.
69. Kvanvig, Jonathan L., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Epistemology, Lanham, MD, 1996. A collection of commissioned papers on the warrant approach developed by Plantinga and related topics. Bears particularly on Chapters 10 and 11.
70. Kyburg, Henry E., Jr., Epistemology and Inference, Minneapolis, 1983. A collection of advanced papers, of which several are especially pertinent to Chapters 10-12.
71. Lackey, Jennifer, Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, Oxford and New York, 2008. A comprehensive theory of the nature and epistemological significance of testimony. Particularly pertinent to Chapters 7 and 11.
72. Lackey, Jennifer and Sosa, Ernest (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford and New York, 2006. Contains contemporary essays squarely relevant to Chapter 7 and bearing on Chapters 11 and 12.
73. Lehrer, Keith, Knowledge, Oxford, 1974. A critique of foundationalism and development of the author's own coherentist theory of knowledge, with a detailed, noncausal account of justification. Particularly relevant to Chapters 1, 4, and 9-11.
74. Lehrer, Keith, Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO, 1990. A successor to his Knowledge that presents a revised theory and remains relevant to Chapters 1, 4, and 9-11.
75. Lewis, C.I., An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, La Salle, IL, 1946. A systematic study, in the foundationalist tradition, of many major epistemological and metaphysical questions. Especially relevant to Chapters 1-6 and 7-11.
76. Locke, Don, Memory, New York, 1971. A concise but wide-ranging treatment of memory and memorial knowledge. Bears mainly on Chapter 3.
77. Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, New York, 1928 (originally published in 1689). A major text in modern epistemology, and a powerful statement of a commonsense empiricism. Bears on each chapter.
78. Luper-Foy, Stephen, The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Lanham, MD, 1987. A set of papers discussing above all Nozick's tracking account of knowledge and its bearing on skepticism. Relevant especially to Chapters 8, 10, and 11.
79. Lycan, William, Judgment and Justification, New York, 1988. An account of justification and of aspects of knowledge, with emphasis on their connection with the notion of explanation and with selected topics in the philosophy of mind. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, and 8-11.
80. Lyons, Jack C., Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World, Oxford and New York, 2009. A monographic, psychologically informed study of perception defending a reliabilistic account of its nature and role in grounding knowledge. Relevant especially to Chapters 1, 2, 8, and 11-14.
81. McGrew, Timothy J., The Foundations of Knowledge, Lanham, MD, 1995. A systematic defense of foundationalism (strong as opposed to moderate); relevant mainly to Chapters 1, 5, 8, and 9.
82. Malcolm, Norman, Knowledge and Certainty, Ithaca, NY, 1975. A collection of epistemological essays by a leading proponent of the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Especially relevant to Chapters 1-4, 10, and 12.
83. Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic, London, 1843. The leading nineteenth-century statement of radical empiricism. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, and 6.
84. Montmarquet, James A., Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, Lanham, MD, A statement and appraisal of a virtue epistemology with special emphasis on the relation between justification and intellectual responsibility. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 10, and 11.
85. Morton, Adam, A Guide through the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd edn, Oxford, 2002. A brief but moderately comprehensive introduction, with more on probability and induction than many short books of the same range. Pertinent to nearly every chapter.
86. Moser, Paul K., Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge and New York, 1993. A rigorous and detailed presentation of an account of knowledge and the nature and scope of its supporting grounds. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, and 9-11.
87. Moser, Paul K., Philosophy after Objectivity, Oxford and New York, 1993. A rigorous treatment of the relation of realism to skepticism and of both to semantic questions about meaning and epistemological questions about evidence, reasons, and justification. Especially pertinent to Chapters 5, 6, and 10-12.
88. Moser, Paul K., The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford and New York, 2002. A collection of wide-ranging papers covering central issues and developments in most of the main the areas treated in this book.
89. Moser, Paul K. and van der Nat, Arnold (eds.), Human Knowledge, 2nd edn, New York, 1995. An extensive set of classical and contemporary readings, with editors' introductions to each section. Pertinent to every chapter.
90. Moser, Paul K., Mulder, Dwayne H., and Trout, J.D. (eds.), The Theory of Knowledge, Oxford, 1998. A brief introduction covering many of the topics in this book and especially pertinent to understanding the relation between epistemology and philosophy of science. Bears on most chapters.
91. Nathan, N.M.L., The Price of Doubt, London, 2000. A systematic treatment of skepticism, with much examination of the notion of evidence and rational belief. Pertinent especially to Chapters 10, 11, 13, and 14.
92. Neta, Ram, and Pritchard, Duncan (eds.), Arguing about Knowledge, London and New York, 2009. A comprehensive anthology covering most of the topics in this book and with editorial introductions to each of its many sections.
93. Niiniluoto, Ilkka, Matti Sintonen, and Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Dordrecht, 2004. A large collection of essays on the major areas of epistemology by. Pertinent to every chapter.
94. Nozick, Robert, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA, 1981. Contains a book-length epistemology section bearing on Chapters 9-11, 13, and 14.
95. Pappas, George S. and Swain, Marshall, Essays on Knowledge and Justification, Ithaca, NY, 1978. A collection of papers, many influential, mainly from professional journals. Especially relevant to Chapters 1 and 10-14.
96. Peacocke, Christopher, Being Known, Oxford, 1999. A philosophical treatment of knowledge, especially self-knowledge, in relation to central issues in philosophy of language and metaphysics, particularly intentionality, representation, and truth. Highly pertinent to Chapters 3, 4, 10, and 11.
97. Plantinga, Alvin, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford and New York, 1993. A systematic development of a theory of warrant as to what renders true belief knowledge and of key epistemic concepts related to warrant. Particularly relevant to Chapters 1, 5, 6, and 10-14.
98. Plantinga, Alvin, Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford and New York, 1993. A critical study of many major epistemological theories. Highly relevant to Chapters 8-14.
99. Plato, Theaetetus, trans. by F.M. Cornford, Cambridge, 1934. A major text in the history of epistemology. Especially relevant to Chapter 10.
100. Pojman, Louis P. (ed.), Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Belmont, CA, 1993. A large collection, with introductions to each section. Relevant to every chapter.
101. Pojman, Louis P., What Can We Know?, 2nd edn, Belmont, CA, 2001. A wide-ranging, highly readable, historically informed introduction with attention both to basic issues and to classical and contemporary literature. Pertinent to every chapter.
102. Pollock, John L., Knowledge and Justification, Princeton, 1974. A systematic, wideranging treatment of these notions which develops a foundationalist account of both. It bears on all the chapters.
103. Price, H.H., Perception, Oxford, 1932. A detailed major study of the topic, with important discussions of sense-data. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, 10, and 11.
104. Pritchard, Duncan, Epistemic Luck, Oxford and New York, 2005. An exploration of how knowledge must be conceived given an understanding of the sense in which it may not be due to luck and of how the resulting conception bears on skepticism. Particularly pertinent to Chapters, 10, 11, and 13.
105. Quine, W.V., The Pursuit of Truth, revised edn, Cambridge, MA, 1992. A short statement of many of Quine's epistemological views, with valuable discussions connecting epistemology with the philosophy of science. The chapters devoted to evidence, meaning, perception, and truth make it especially pertinent to Chapters 1, 5, 6, 10, and 12.
106. Quine, W.V. and Ullian, Joseph, The Web of Belief, 2nd edn, New York, 1978. An introductory treatment of the development of commonsense and scientific knowledge. Bears particularly on Chapters 1, 2, and 8-10.
107. Quinton, Anthony, The Nature of Things, London, 1973. A survey of problems in metaphysics and epistemology, with much discussion of the foundationalism- coherentism controversy. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 9, and 10.
108. Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, London, 1869 (originally published in 1785). An important critique of other modern philosophers, rationalist and empiricist, and an original development of a commonsense epistemology. Especially relevant to Chapters 1-7 and 10-14.
109. Rescher, Nicholas, Skepticism, Oxford, 1980. A detailed critical survey of many of the arguments for skepticism. Especially relevant to Chapters 10-14.
110. Robinson, Howard, Perception, London, 1994. A historically detailed defense of the sense-datum theory in the philosophy of perception. Bears on Chapters 1-4.
111. Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, 1979. A widely discussed critique of the foundationalist tradition in epistemology (and indeed of aspects of epistemology itself), with special attention to foundationalism as deriving from Descartes. Pertinent especially to Chapters 1 and 9.
112. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, London, 1912. An influential introductory and highly readable survey of epistemology and metaphysics. Particularly pertinent to Chapters 1, 4, and 10-14.
113. Russell, Bertrand, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London, 1940. An articulation of an overall epistemological position by one of the twentieth century's major epistemologists. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, and 8-11.
114. Sellars, Wilfrid, Science, Perception, and Reality, London, 1963. A collection of advanced epistemological papers by a major contemporary philosopher and leading coherentist. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1-4 and 9-12.
115. Shope, Robert, The Analysis of Knowing, Princeton, 1983. A highly detailed study of major kinds of analysis of knowledge. Especially relevant to Chapters 10 and 11.
116. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Moral Skepticisms, Oxford and New York, 2006. A development of a contrastivist epistemology, with detailed analysis of its bearing on the possibility of moral knowledge and an account of the scope and varieties of plausible skepticisms. Pertinent especially to Chapters 8, 10, and 12-14.
117. Sosa, Ernest, Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge and New York, 1991. A wideranging collection of papers intensively exploring most of the topics treated in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 10, and 11, and introducing a sophisticated and influential version of virtue epistemology.
118. Sosa, Ernest, Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford and New York, 2007. A detailed statement of Sosa's version of virtue epistemology, with special relevance to Chapters 1, 8, and 10-12.
119. Sosa, Ernest and Kim, Jaegwon (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology, Oxford and New York, 2000. A wide-ranging set of mainly recent writings on justification, knowledge, and skepticism. Highly pertinent to Chapters 1, 6, 8, and 10.
120. Steup, Matthias, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1996. A comprehensive and systematic introduction to epistemology, with close attention both to theoretical and conceptual issues and to major statements in the literature.
121. Steup, Matthias, Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Oxford and New York, 2001. A collection of recent papers focusing largely on the relation between belief and will and on how that relation bears on knowledge and justification in general and on virtue epistemology in particular. Particularly relevant to Chapters 10 and 11.
122. Steup, Matthias, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, 2005. A volume in which prominent contemporary epistemologists debate major issues, including many central in this book. Especially relevant to Chapters 8-14.
123. Stroud, Barry, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford, 1984. An intensive study of skepticism, particularly as set out by Descartes. Particularly relevant to Chapters 1, 2, 10, 12, and 13.
124. Swain, Marshall, Reasons and Knowledge, Ithaca, NY, 1981. A rigorous statement of an account of knowledge that unites justificationist and reliabilist elements. Especially relevant to Chapters 1, 2, 8, 10, and 11.
125. Swinburne, Richard, Epistemic Justification, Oxford and New York, 2001. A wideranging treatise with much on the contrast between internalism and externalism; it clarifies the importance of probability for justification and explores the relation between the genesis of beliefs and their epistemic standing. Particularly pertinent to Chapters 8 and 9-11.
126. Unger, Peter, Ignorance, Oxford, 1975. A full-scale case for skepticism. Bears particularly on Chapters 1, 2, 10, 12, and 13.
127. Vinci, Thomas, Cartesian Truth, Oxford and New York, 1998. An interpretation of Descartes's epistemology that rigorously defends some main Cartesian ideas. Bears especially on Chapters 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, and 11.
128. Will, Frederick L., Induction and Justification, Ithaca, NY, 1974. A critical study of a foundationalist approach to justification, with much attention to the problem of induction. Especially relevant to Chapters 9-14.
129. Williams, Michael, Unnatural Doubts, Oxford, 1991. A detailed diagnostic account of skepticism and some major issues concerning the possibility of foundations of knowledge. Pertinent especially to Chapters 1, 2, and 9-12.
130. Williams, Michael, Problems of Knowledge, Oxford and New York, 2001. A broad treatment of many of the problems of epistemology, with particular attention to skepticism. Pertinent to nearly every chapter.
131. Williamson, Timothy, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford and New York, 2000. A rigorous defense of the idea that knowledge is a state of mind and should be taken as a basis for understanding other notions important in epistemology, such as evidence, rather than analyzed in terms of allegedly more basic notions. Especially pertinent to Chapters 1, 2, 8-11, and 13.
132. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, 1953. Wittgenstein's most wide-ranging and influential work, spanning topics in epistemology, metaphysics, and other philosophical areas. Its remarks and examples bear on every chapter.
133. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, trans. by Dennis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, 1969. An important discussion of the topic by one of the major twentieth-century philosophers. Especially relevant to Chapters 9-14.
134. Zagzebski, Linda, Virtues of the Mind, New York, 1996. A statement of virtue epistemology distinctive for its background account of virtue ethics as the counterpart on which virtue epistemology should be based. Pertinent above all to Chapters and 11.