Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World

Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-288

  Lyons, Jack C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Basic Belief; Epistemology; Evidence; Evidentialism; Externalism; Inference; Justification; Modularity; Noninferential Justification; Perception; Reliabilism

Indexed keywords

EID: 61149424845     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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