Party size and portfolio payoffs: The proportional allocation of ministerial posts in coalition governments

Journal of Legislative Studies

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 10-34

  Bäck, Hanna ^a   Meier, Henk Erik ^b   Persson, Thomas ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER   (Germany)

^c UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Causal mechanisms; Coalition governments; Gamson's Law; Ministerial posts; Portfolio allocation

Indexed keywords

EID: 85055367452     PISSN: 13572334     EISSN: 17439337     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13572330802666760     Document Type: Article

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