Making the first move: A two-stage analysis of the role of formateurs in parliamentary government formation

Public Choice

Volumn 135, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 353-373

  Bäck, Hanna ^a   Dumont, Patrick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LUXEMBOURG   (Luxembourg)

Author keywords

Coalition bargaining; Formateur parties; Government formation; Parliamentary democracies; Two stage model

Indexed keywords

EID: 42449149095     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9267-5     Document Type: Article

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