Vive la diversité! High Reliability Organisation (HRO) and Resilience Engineering (RE)

Safety Science

Volumn 117, Issue , 2019, Pages 469-478

  Le Coze, Jean Christophe ^a  

^a INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L ENVIRONNEMENT INDUSTRIEL ET DES RISQUES INERIS   (France)

Author keywords

Complementarities; High reliability organisation; Nuances; Research traditions; Resilience engineering

Indexed keywords

RELIABILITY;

COMPLEMENTARITIES; HIGH RELIABILITY; NUANCES; RESEARCH TRADITIONS; RESILIENCE ENGINEERINGS;

SAFETY ENGINEERING;

ACCIDENT; ARTICLE; COGNITION; ENGINEERING; ERROR; ETHNOGRAPHY; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION; HUMAN; MEDICAL RESEARCH; MINDFULNESS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RELIABILITY; RESILIENCE ENGINEERING; SAFETY; SCHOOL;

EID: 85048737078     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: 18791042     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2016.04.006     Document Type: Article

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