New models for new times. An anti-dualist move

Safety Science

Volumn 59, Issue , 2013, Pages 200-218

  Le Coze, Jean Christophe ^a  

^a INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L ENVIRONNEMENT INDUSTRIEL ET DES RISQUES INERIS   (France)

Author keywords

Anti dualism; Complexity; Metaphors; Networks; Popular safety models

Indexed keywords

ANTI-DUALISM; COLLECTIVE MINDFULNESS; COMPLEXITY; GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS; METAPHORS; RESILIENCE ENGINEERINGS; SAFETY CRITICAL SYSTEMS; SAFETY MODELS;

ACCIDENTS; GRAPHIC METHODS; NETWORKS (CIRCUITS); PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS;

COMPLEX NETWORKS;

ACCIDENT PREVENTION; ANALYTIC METHOD; ANALYTICAL PARAMETERS; ARTICLE; COGNITION; DISASTER; ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE; EPISTEMOLOGY; MANAGER; MEDICAL INFORMATION; MEDICAL PRACTICE; MEDICAL RESEARCH; OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY; PHILOSOPHY; POLITICAL SYSTEM; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE; SOCIO NATURAL TECHNICAL SYSTEM; SOCIOLOGY; SYNTHESIS; SYSTEMIC AND DYNAMIC SENSITISING MODEL OF SAFETY;

EID: 84880376695     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: 18791042     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2013.05.010     Document Type: Article

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