The High Reliability Organization Perspective

Human Factors in Aviation

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 123-143

  Dekker, Sidney W A ^a   Woods, David D ^b  

^a Lund University   (Sweden)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78049417931     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-374518-7.00005-5     Document Type: Chapter

References (32)

1. Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB) (2006) Aircraft accident report (11/2006): Helios Airways flight HCY522, Boeing 737–31S at Grammatiko, Hellas on 14 August 2005. Athens, Greece: Helenic Republic Ministry of Transport and Communications
2. R. Amalberti (2001) The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety science 37 109-126.
3. R.I. Cook and D.D. Woods (2006) Distancing through Differencing: An Obstacle to Learning Following Accidents. E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods, N. Leveson (Eds) Resilience engineering: concepts and precepts Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 329-338.
4. V. De Keyser and D.D. Woods (1990) Fixation errors: Failures to revise situation assessment in dynamic and risky systems. A.G. Colombo, A. Saiz de Bustamante (Eds) System reliability assessment The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 231-251.
5. S.W.A. Dekker (2005) Ten questions about human error: A new view of human factors and system safety. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
6. S.W.A. Dekker (2006) Resilience Engineering: Chronicling the emergence of a confused consensus. E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods, N. Leveson (Eds) Resilience engineering: concepts and precepts Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 77-92.
7. S.W.A. Dekker (2007) Just Culture: Balancing safety and accountability Aldershot, UK: Ashgate
8. A. Gras, C. Moricot, S.L. Poirot-Delpech and V. Scardigli (1994) Faced with automation: The pilot, the controller, and the engineer (trans. J. Lundsten). Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne
9. E. Hollnagel (2009) The ETTO principle, efficiency-thoroughness tradeoff: Why things that go right sometimes go wrong Aldershot, UK: Ashgate
10. E. Hollnagel, N. Leveson and D.D. Woods (Eds) (2006) Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts Aldershot, UK: Ashgate
11. T.R. LaPorte and P.M. Consolini (1991) Working in Practice but not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of High-Reliability Organizations. Journal of public administration research and theory 1 19-47.
12. N. Leveson (2006) A new approach to system safety engineering. Cambridge, MA: Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
13. E.S. Patterson, E.M. Roth, D.D. Woods, R. Chow and J.O. Gomez (2004) Handoff strategies in settings with high consequences for failure: Lessons for health care operations. International journal for quality in health care 16(2), 125-132.
14. J.T. Reason (1990) Human error. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
15. G.I. Rochlin, T.R. LaPorte and K.H. Roberts (1987) The self-designing high-reliability organization: aircraft carrier flight operations at sea. Naval War College Review Autumn 1987
16. G.I. Rochlin (1993) Defining high-reliability organizations in practice: A taxonomic prolegomenon. K.H. Roberts (Eds) New challenges to understanding organizations New York: Macmillan 11-32.
17. G.I. Rochlin (1999) Safe operation as a social construct. Ergonomics 42 1549-1560.
18. S.A. Snook (2000) Friendly fire: the accidental shootdown of us black hawks over northern Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
19. W.H. Starbuck and M. Farjoun (Eds) (2005) Organization at the limit: lessons from the columbia disaster London: Blackwell Publishing
20. K. Sutcliffe and T. Vogus (2003) Organizing for resilience. K.S. Cameron, I.E. Dutton, R.E. Quinn (Eds) Positive organizational scholarship San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler 94-110.
21. D. Vaughan (1996) The challenger launch decision: risky technology, culture and deviance at NASA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
22. J. Watts-Perotti and D.D. Woods (2009) Cooperative Advocacy: A Strategy for Integrating Diverse Perspectives in Anomaly Response. Computer supported cooperative work: the journal of collaborative computing 18(2), 175-198.
23. K.E. Weick (1988) Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations. Journal of management studies 25(4), 305-317.
24. K.E. Weick (1993) The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. Administrative science quarterly 38(4), 628-652.
25. K.E. Weick, K.M. Sutcliffe and D. Obstfeld (1999) Organizing for high reliability: Processes of collective mindfulness. Research in organizational behavior 21 13-81.
26. Woods, D.D (2003). Creating foresight: How resilience engineering can transform NASA’s approach to risky decision making. US Senate Testimony for the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, John McCain, chair. Washington, DC, October 29 2003. http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/podcasts/woods
27. D.D. Woods (2005) Creating foresight: Lessons for resilience from Columbia. W.H. Starbuck, M. Farjoun (Eds) Organization at the limit: NASA and the columbia disaster Malden, MA: Blackwell 289-308.
28. D.D. Woods (2006) Essential characteristics of resilience for organizations. E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods, N. Leveson (Eds) Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts Aldershot, UK: Ashgate
29. D.D. Woods (2006) How to design a safety organization: Test case for resilience engineering. E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods, N. Leveson (Eds) Resilience engineering: concepts and precepts Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 315-324.
30. D.D. Woods (2009) Escaping failures of foresight. Safety science 47(4), 498-501.
31. D.D. Woods and R.I. Cook (2003) Mistaking error. M.J. Hatlie, B.J. Youngberg (Eds) Patient safety handbook Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett 95-108.
32. Woods, D. D., Dekker, S. W. A., Cook, R. I., Johannesen, L., & Sarter, N. (in press). Behind Human Error (2nd ed). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.