1984-2014. Normal Accidents. Was Charles Perrow Right for the Wrong Reasons?

Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 275-286

  Le Coze, Jean Christophe ^a  

^a INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L ENVIRONNEMENT INDUSTRIEL ET DES RISQUES INERIS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCIDENT; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 84945464611     PISSN: 09660879     EISSN: 14685973     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12090     Document Type: Article

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