Corporate Governance

The Blackwell Handbook of Strategic Management

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 543-564

  Chatterjee, Sayan ^a   Harrison, Jeffrey S ^b  

^a CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Boards of directors; Organizational crises; Organizational outcomes

Indexed keywords

EID: 85044961041     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631218616.2006.00020.x     Document Type: Chapter

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