Governance patterns in bankruptcy reorganizations

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 17, Issue 5, 1996, Pages 355-375

  Daily, Catherine M ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Audit committee; Bankruptcy reorganization; Boards of directors; Institutional investors

Indexed keywords

BANKRUPTCY; BOARD OF DIRECTORS; FIRM;

FINANCE;

MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0030355603     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199605)17:5<355::aid-smj813>3.0.co;2-s     Document Type: Article

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