Board independence and the variability of firm performance: Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock

Australian Journal of Management

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2018, Pages 3-26

  Bird, Ron ^a,b   Huang, Peng ^a   Lu, Yue ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO   (New Zealand)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Board independence; exogenous regulatory shock; firm performance variability

Indexed keywords

EID: 85040447381     PISSN: 03128962     EISSN: 13272020     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0312896217708227     Document Type: Article

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