Putting renewable energy auctions into action – An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany

Energy Policy

Volumn 110, Issue , 2017, Pages 394-402

  Anatolitis, Vasilios ^a,b,c   Welisch, Marijke ^b  

^a FRAUNHOFER INSTITUTE FOR SYSTEMS AND INNOVATION RESEARCH ISI   (Germany)

^b VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Austria)

^c KARLSRUHE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agent based modelling; Auction simulation; Onshore wind power; Pay as bid; Uniform pricing

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; COSTS; RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES; WIND POWER;

AGENT-BASED MODELLING; AUCTION SIMULATION; ONSHORE WINDS; PAY AS BID; UNIFORM PRICING;

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS;

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY; NUMERICAL MODEL; PRICE DETERMINATION; RENEWABLE RESOURCE; WIND POWER;

GERMANY;

EID: 85028826969     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.08.024     Document Type: Article

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