Designing electricity auctions

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 23-46

  Fabra, Natalia ^a,b   Von Der Fehr, Nils Henrik ^c   Harbord, David ^d  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b CEPR   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^d Market Analysis Ltd   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748328103     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00002.x     Document Type: Review

References (31)

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