Inefficiency of standard multi-unit auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 8125 LNCS, Issue , 2013, Pages 385-396

  De Keijzer, Bart ^a   Markakis, Evangelos ^c   Schäfer, Guido ^a,b   Telelis, Orestis ^c  

^a CWI   (Netherlands)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MULTI-UNIT AUCTION; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE; UNIFORM PRICE; UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION; UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS; VALUATION FUNCTION;

ALGORITHMS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

COSTS;

EID: 84884333607     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40450-4_33     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (22)

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