Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 81, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 1366-1400

  Ausubel, Lawrence M ^a   Cramton, Peter ^a   Pycia, Marek ^b   Rostek, Marzena ^c   Weretka, Marek ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Demand reduction; Electricity auctions; Multi unit auctions; Treasury auctions

Indexed keywords

DEMAND ANALYSIS; ELECTRICITY GENERATION; ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; ENERGY MARKET; RANKING; SYMMETRY;

EID: 84928524124     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdu023     Document Type: Article

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