A truthful mechanism for value-based scheduling in cloud computing

Theory of Computing Systems

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 388-406

  Jain, Navendu ^a   Menache, Ishai ^a  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b Seffi)   (Israel)

Author keywords

Approximation algorithms; Cloud computing; Mechanism design; Resource allocation; Scheduling algorithms

Indexed keywords

CLOUD COMPUTING; ECONOMICS; MACHINE DESIGN; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS;

APPROXIMATION FACTOR; BLACK-BOX REDUCTIONS; CLOUD ENVIRONMENTS; MECHANISM DESIGN; PRICING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION ALGORITHMS; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS; WILLINGNESS TO PAY;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 85027928587     PISSN: 14324350     EISSN: 14330490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00224-013-9449-0     Document Type: Article

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