The Impact of Incentive Compensation on Labor Productivity in Family and Nonfamily Firms

Family Business Review

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2017, Pages 119-136

  Chrisman, James J ^a,b   Devaraj, Srikant ^c   Patel, Pankaj C ^d  

^a MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^c BALL STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

adverse selection; family firms; incentive compensation; labor productivity; nonfamily employees

Indexed keywords

EID: 85019202674     PISSN: 08944865     EISSN: 17416248     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0894486517690052     Document Type: Article

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