Corporate governance and blockchains

Review of Finance

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2017, Pages 7-31

  Yermack, David ^a  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Blockchains; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Shareholder activism

Indexed keywords

EID: 85018947411     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfw074     Document Type: Review

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