The European Central bank: The new European leviathian? Revised second edition

The European Central Bank: The New European Leviathan? Revised Second Edition

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-272

  Howarth, David ^a   Loedel, Peter ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b WEST CHESTER UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85015966020     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230503106     Document Type: Book

References (265)

1. Aeschimann, E. and Riché, P. (1996) La guerre de sept ans: histoire secrète du franc fort, 1989-1996 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy).
2. Agence Europe
3. Aglietta, M. (1995) ‘Etat, monnaie et risque de système en Europe’, in B. Théret, L’Etat la finance et le social: souveraineté nationale et construction européenne (Paris: Editions La Découverte), pp. 432-82.
4. Aglietta, M. and de Boissieu, C. (1998) ‘La responsabilité de la future Banque centrale européenne’, in Conseil d’Analyse Economique, Coordination européenne des politiques économiques (Paris: La Documentation française).
5. Alesina, A. and Summers, L. (1992) ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money and Credit, vol. 25, no. 2: 151-62.
6. Angeloni, I., Kashyap, A., Mojon, B. and Terlizzese, D. (2003) ‘Monetary Transmission in the Euro Area: Where Do We Stand?’, in Angeloni I., Kashyap, A., Mojon, B., eds, Monetary Transmission in the Euro Area, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Anonymous (1985) ‘La réforme du pouvoir monétaire en France’, Commentaire, 31, Autumn, pp. 788-96.
8. Amtenbrink, F. (1999) The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: a Comparative Study of the European Central Bank (Oxford: Hart Publishing).
9. Artis, M. and Wrinkler, B. (1997) ‘The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the ECB’, CEPR Working Paper no. 1688 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
10. Attali, J. (1993, 1994, 1995) Verbatim I, II, III (Paris: Fayard).
11. Axelrod, R. M. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books).
12. Balleix-Banerjee, C. (1995) ‘Libéraux et centristes [français] face au projet de Banque central européenne’, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, 387, pp. 228-37.
13. Balleix-Banerjee, C. (1993) ‘Discours politique et intégration européenne: les gaullistes face au projet de Banque centrale européenne, Revue d’Intégration européenne, 17, 1, pp. 7-52.
14. Balleix-Banerjee, C. (1997) La France et la Banque Centrale Européenne: débats politiques et élaboration de la décision, janvier 1988-septembre 1992, Doctoral thesis, University Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, 10 January 1997.
15. Balleix-Banerjee, C. (1999) La France et la Banque Centrale Européenne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France).
16. Baldwin, R., Berglof, E., Giavazzi, F. and Widgren, M. (2001a) Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice be Ratified?, Washington, DC: Brookings.
17. Balleix-Banerjee, C. (2001b) ‘Preparing the ECB for Enlargement’ CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 6.
18. Bank of England (1999) ‘The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 39, no. 2.
19. Bauchard, P. (1994) Deux ministres trop tranquilles (Paris: Belfond).
20. Baun, M. J. (1995) ‘The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France and European Integration’, Political Science Quarterly, 110, 4, pp. 605-34.
21. Bean, C. (1992) ‘Economic and Monetary Union in Europe’, Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper, 86 (London: LSE), July.
22. Beaumont, P. and Walker N, eds (1999) Legal Framework of the Single European Currency (Oxford: Hart).
23. Begg, D., De Grauwe, P., Giavazzi, F., Uhlig, H. and Wyplosz, C. (1998) ‘The ECB: Safe at Any Speed?’, Monitoring the European Central Bank (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
24. Berman, S. and McNamara, K. (1999) ‘Bank on Democracy - Why Central Bankers Need Public Oversight’, Foreign Affairs (March/April), pp. 2-8.
25. Bernard, W. (1998) ‘A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence’, American Political Science Review, 92, 2 (June), pp. 311-27.
26. Bini Smaghi, Lorenzo (1996) ‘How can the ECB be credible?, EUI Working Paper, Robert Schuman Centre, 96/24 (Florence: European University Institute).
27. Bjorksten, N. (2000) ‘Economic Catching Up in the Enlarged Euro Area: Implications for the Common Monetary Policy’, EUI Working Papers, RSC, no. 2000/52. See http://www.ieu.it/RSC/WP-Texts/00_52.pdf.
28. Blackburn, K. and Christensen M. (1989) ‘Monetary Policy and Credibility’, Journal of Economic Literature, 27 (March): 1-45.
29. Blair, Alasdair (2002) Saving the Pound?: Britain’s Road to Monetary Union (London: Prentice Hall).
30. Blessing, K. (1966) Im Kampf um Gutes Geld (Frankfurt: Deutsche Bunderbank).
31. Blinder, A. (1998) Central Banking in Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: MITPress).
32. Bouvier, J. (1988) ‘The Banque de France and the State from 1850 to the Present Day’, in G. Toniolo, ed., Central Banks’ Independence in Historical Perspective (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 73-104.
33. Boyer, R. (1999) Le Gouvernement Economique de la Zone Euro (Paris: La Documentation française). Report of the ‘groupe de réflexion’ of the French Planning Commission presided over by Boyer.
34. Boyer, R. (2000) ‘The Unanticipated Fallout of the European Monetary Union: the Political and Institutional Deficits of the Euro’, in C. Crouch, ed., After the Euro: Shaping Institutions for Governance in the Wake of European Monetary Union (Oxford: OUP), pp. 24-88.
35. Boyle, A. (1967) Montagu Norman: a Biography (London: Cassell).
36. Brentford, P. (1998) ‘Constitutional Aspects of the Independence of the European Central Bank’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 47, 1: 75-116.
37. Brueckner, M, (1997) ‘Voting and Decisions in the ECB’, EUI working paper, ECO No. 97/29, Badia Fiesolana: EUI.
38. Buiter, W. (1999) ‘Alice in Euroland’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.37, no. 2, pp. 181-209.
39. Bulmer, S. and Scott, A., eds (1994) Economic and Political Integration in Europe: internal dynamics and global context (Oxford: Blackwell).
40. Busch, A. (1994) ‘Central Bank Independence and the Westminister Model’, West European Politics 17, pp. 53-702.
41. Business Week (2000) ‘Who’s in Charge of Europe’s Money?’, March 27, pp. 24-8.
42. Calvert, R. L., McCubbins, M. D. and Weingast, B. R. (1989) ‘A theory of political control and agency discretion’, in American Journal of Political Science, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 588-611.
43. Cairncross, A. (1988) ‘The Bank of England: Relationships with the Government, the Civil Service, and Parliament’, in G. Toniolo, ed., Central Banks’ Independence in Historical Perspective, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.
44. Cameron, D. R., (1995) ‘Transnational relations and the development of European economic and monetary union’, in T. Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing transnational relations back in. Non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions (Cambridge: CUP), pp. 37-78.
45. Campanella, M. (1995) ‘Getting to the core. A neo-institutionalist approach to EMU’, Government and Opposition, 30, 3, pp. 347-69.
46. Campanella, M. (2000) ‘The Battle between ECOFIN-11 and the European Central Bank: a Strategic Interaction Perspective’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith, eds, The State of the European Union, vol. 5 (Oxford: OUP), pp. 110-26.
47. Ceasar, R. and Scharrer, H.E., eds, (1999) Ökonomische and politische Dimensionen der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).
48. Cohen, B. J. (1993) ‘The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Lessons for the Pacific Region’, in Richard Higgot, Richard Leaver and John Underhill, eds, Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? (London: Allen and Unwin), pp. 133-58.
49. Collingen, S. and Schwarzer, D. (2002) The Power of Ideas: the Contribution to the Euro by the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (London: Routledge).
50. Corsetti, G. and Pesenti, P. (1999) ‘Stability, Asymmetry and Discontinuity: The Outset of European Monetary Union’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Washington: Brookings.
51. Connolly, B. (1995) The Rotten Heart of Europe, the Dirty War for Europe’s Money (London: Faber and Faber).
52. Craig, G. (1982) The Germans (New York: Meridian).
53. Craig, P. (1999) ‘EMU, the European Central Bank and Judicial Review’ in Beaumont, P. and Walker N. (1999) Legal Framework of the Single European Currency (Oxford: Hart), pp. 95-119.
54. Cross, S. Y. (1994) ‘Review Essay: Following the Bundesbank: the Spread of Central Bank Independence’, in Foreign Affairs, March/April, 73, 2, pp. 128-33.
55. Crouch, C., ed. (2001) After the Euro: Shaping Institutions for Governance in the Wake of European Monetary Union (Oxford: OUP).
56. Crowley, Patrick (2001) ‘The Institutional Implications of EMU’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39, 3, pp. 385-404.
57. De Haan, J. (1997) ‘The European Central Bank: Independence, Accountability and Strategy: a Review’, Public Choice, 93, pp. 395-426.
58. Dehousse, R. (1992) ‘Integration v. regulation? On the dynamics of regulation in the European Community’, Journal of Common Market Studies 4, pp. 383-402.
59. Delors Report (1989) Report on economic and moentary union in the European Community (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union), Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC.
60. Demertzis, M. (2001) ‘Can the ECB be truly independent?’, in A. Hallett et al., Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union (Boston: Kluwer Academic Press) pp. 105-27.
61. Deutsche Bundesbank, Auszüge aus Presse Artikeln, (Frankfurt/Main).
62. Deutsche Bundesbank (2001) ‘Monetary Aspect of the Enlargement of the EU’, Monthly Report, October, Frankfurt: Deutsche Bundesbank. See http://www.bundesbank.de/en/monatsbericht/textteil/bericht10/01/mb1001ges_e.pdf.
63. DiMaggio, P. J. and W. W. Powell (1991) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organisational Fields’, in P. J. DiMaggio and W. W. Powell, eds, The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), pp. 63-82.
64. Dinan, D. (1999) Ever Closer Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan - now Palgrave Macmillan).
65. Dobson, W. (1991) Economic Policy Coordination: requiem or prologue?(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics).
66. Dornbusch, R., Favero, C. and Giavazzi, F. (1998) ‘Immediate Challenges for the European Central Bank’, Economic Policy, 26, April, 17-52.
67. Duisenberg, W. (1999) Press Conference, European Central Bank, 8 April, http://www.ecb.int/key/st990408.htm
68. Duisenberg, W. (2000a) ‘The euro as a catalyst for legal convergence in Europe, speech delivered to the Annual conference of the International Bar Association’, Amsterdam 17 September.
69. Duisenberg, W. (2000b) ‘The role of the ECB at the international level’, Speech at the Annual meeting of the Institute of the International Finance, Inc. (IIF), Prague, 23 September.
70. Duisenberg, W. (2000c) ‘Making Monetary Policy in a Broad Monetary Union’, Jean Monnet Lecture at the London Business School, 12 October.
71. Dyson, K. (1994) Elusive Union: the Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (London: Longman).
72. Dyson, K. (1997) ‘La France, L’Union économique et monétaire et la construction européenne: renforcer l’exécutif, transformer l’Etat’, Revue Politiques et Management Public, 13, 3, septembre, pp. 57-77.
73. Dyson, K. (1999a) ‘EMU, Political Discourse and the Fifth French Republic: Historical institutionalism, path dependence and ‘craftsmen’ of discourse’, Modern and Contemporary France, 7, 2, May.
74. Dyson, K. (1999b) ‘France, Germany and the Euro-Zone: from “Motor” of EMU to Living in an ECB-Centric Euro-Zone’, Paper presented at conference France, Germany and Britain - Partners in a Changing World, University of Bradford, UK, 21 May 1999.
75. Dyson, K. (2000) The Politics of the Euro-Zone, Stability or Breakdown? (Oxford: OUP).
76. Dyson, K. (2002a) ‘Germany and the Euro: Redefining EMU, Handling Paradox, and Managing Uncertainty and Contingency’, in K. Dyson, ed., European States and the Euro (Oxford: OUP), pp. 173-211.
77. Dyson, K. ed., (2002b) European States and the Euro: Europeanisation, Variation and Convergence (Oxford: OUP).
78. Dyson, K., Featherstone, K. and Michalopoulos, G. (1995) ‘Strapped to the Mast: EC Central Bankers between Global and Regional Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2, 3: 465-87.
79. Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1996a) ‘France, EMU and Construction Européenne: Empowering the Executive, Transforming the State’, paper presented to the Eight International Conference of the Journal Politiques et Management Public, 20-21 June 1996, Paris.
80. Dyson, K. (1996b) ‘Interlocking Core Executives: Explaining the Negotiation of Economic and Monetary Union’, paper for the 24th European Consortium of Political Research, Joint Sessions of Workshops, Oslo, 29.3-3.4.1996.
81. Dyson, K. (1999) The Road to Maastricht (Oxford: OUP).
82. Economist
83. Eichengreen, B. (1993) Elusive Stability: Essays in the History of International Finance, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
84. Eichengreen, B. and Frieden, J., eds, (2001) The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification, second edn (Boulder, Colorado: Westview).
85. Eichengreen, B. (1998) Globalizing Capital (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
86. Eichengreen, B. and Ghironi, F. (2001) ‘EMU and Enlargement’, unpublished manuscript. See http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/WP481.pdf.
87. Eijffinger, S. and de Haan, J. (2000) European Monetary and Fiscal Policy (Oxford: OUP).
88. Elgie, R. (1998) ‘Democratic accountability and central bank independence: historical and contemporary, national and European perspectives’, in West European Politics, 21, 3, 53-76.
89. Elgie, R. (2001) ‘Democratic Accountability and Central Bank Independence: a Reply to Various Critics’, West European Politics, 24, 1, January, pp. 217-21.
90. Elgie, R. (2002) ‘The politics of the European Central Bank: principal-agent theory and the democratic deficit’, European Public Policy, 9, 2, April, pp. 186-200.
91. Elgie, R. and Thompson, H. (1998) The Politics of Central Banks (London: Routledge).
92. Emminger, O. (1966) Währungspolitik im Wandel der Zeit (Frankfurt: Deutsche Bundesbank).
93. Emminger, O. (1986) D-Mark, Dollar, und Währungskrisen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt).
94. ECB (European Central Bank) (1998a) TARGET: the Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System (Frankfurt: ECB) July.
95. ECB (European Central Bank) (1998b) The Single Monetary Policy in Stage Three: General Documentation on ESCB Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures (Frankfurt: ECB) September.
96. ECB (European Central Bank) (1999a) ‘The Stability-Oriented Monetary Policy Strategy of the Eurosystem’, Monthly Bulletin, January: 39-50.
97. ECB (European Central Bank) (1999b) Annual Report 1998 (Frankfurt: ECB).
98. ECB (European Central Bank) (2000a) Annual Report 1999 (Frankfurt: ECB).
99. ECB (European Central Bank) (2000b) Hearing before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Parliament, March 20.
100. ECB (European Central Bank) (2000c) Monthly Bulletin, December.
101. ECB (European Central Bank) (2001) Annual Report 2000 (Frankfurt: ECB).
102. ECB (European Central Bank) (2001a) Annual Report 2000 (Frankfurt: ECB)
103. ECB (European Central Bank) (2001b) ‘The role of central banks in prudential supervision’ (Frankfurt: ECB).
104. ECB (European Central Bank) (2002) Annual Report 2001 (Frankfurt: ECB).
105. ECB (European Central Bank) (2002) Monthly Bulletin, November 2002. See http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb20021en.pdf.
106. ECB (European Central Bank) (2003) Annual Report 2002 (Frankfurt: ECB).
107. ECB (European Central Bank) (2004) Annual Report 2003 (Frankfurt: ECB).
108. EMI (European Monetary Institute) (1995) The TARGET System (Frankfurt: EMI) May.
109. EMI (European Monetary Institute) (1997a) The Single Monetary Policy in Stage Three: Specification of the Operational Framework (Frankfurt: EMI) January.
110. EMI (European Monetary Institute) (1997b) The Single Monetary Policy in Stage Three: Elements of the Monetary Policy Strategy of the ESCB (Frankfurt: EMI) February.
111. EMI (European Monetary Institute) (1998) Convergence Report, (Frankfurt: EMI).
112. European Parliament (EP) (2001) ‘Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area’, Luxembourg: Directorate-General for Research. See http://www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/econ/pdf/110rev_en.pdf.
113. Everson, M. (1999) ‘The Constitutional Law of the Euro? Disciplining European Governance’, Beaumont, P. and Walker N. (1999) Legal Framework of the Single European Currency (Oxford: Hart) pp. 119-41.
114. Fairlamb, D. (1999) ‘Can the ECB Cope?’ Institutional Investor, July: 62-4.
115. Fatum, R (2000) ‘Economical and Political Implications of Bargaining Versus Voting in a Monetary Union’, Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper no. 00-16. See http://sccie.ucsc.edu/papers/workingpapers/2000/sccie-00-16.pdf.
116. Favero, C., Freixias, X., Persson, T. and Wyplosz, C. (2000) One Money, Many Countries: Monitoring the European Central Bank 2 (London: CEPR).
117. Favier, P. and Martin-Roland, M. (1991) La Décennie Mitterrand, II, Les épreuves (1984-88) (Paris: Editions du Seuil).
118. Feldman, G. (1993) The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914-1924, (New York: Oxford University Press).
119. The Financial Times
120. Fitoussi, J.-P. (1995) Le Débat Interdit, Monnaie, Europe, Pauvreté (Paris: Arléa).
121. Fitoussi, J. P. et al. (1993) Competitive Disinflation. The mark and budgetary politics in Europe (Oxford: OUP).
122. Forder, James (2001) ‘Debate: Some Methodological Issues in the Statutory Characterisation of Central Bank, West Europe Politics, 24, 1, January, pp.202-16.
123. Fratianni, M. and von Hagen, J. (1990) ‘Public Choice Aspects of European Monetary Unification’, in The Cato Journal, 10, 2, pp. 329-43.
124. Frieden, J., Gros, D. and Jones, E., eds, (1998) The New Political Economy of EMU(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield).
125. Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A. (1963) A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
126. Gamble, Andrew and Kelly, Gavin (2002) ‘Britain and EMU’, in K. Dyson, ed., European States and the Euro (Oxford: OUP), 97-119.
127. Garcin, T. (1993) ‘L’unification allemande et la classe politique française’, Hérodote, 68, January-March, pp. 112-24.
128. Genscher, H.-D. (1998) Rebuilding a house divided: a memoir by the architect of Germany’s reunification (New York: Broadway) (translated from the 1995 original in German).
129. Gill S. (1997) ‘An EMU or an ostrich? EMU and neo-liberal economic integration.Limits and alterantives’ in Minkkinen, P. and Patomäki, H., eds, The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union, Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti, 205-29.
130. Goodfriend, M (1999) ‘The Role of a Regional Bank in a System of Central Banks’, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper 99-4.
131. Goodhart, C.A.E. (1988) The Evolution of Central Banks (Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress).
132. Goodhart, C.A.E. (1993) Central Bank Independence, (London: LSE Financial Markets Group).
133. Goodman, J. B. (1991) ‘The Politics of Central Bank Independence’ in Comparative Politics, 23, 3, April 1991, pp. 329-49.
134. Goodman, J. B. (1992) Monetary Sovereignty: the Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe (Ithaca: Cornell).
135. Gormley, L. and de Haan, J. (1996) ‘The Democratic Deficit of the European Central Bank’, European Law Review, 2,1, 95-112.
136. Grahl, J. (1997) After Maastricht, a Guide to European Monetary Union (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
137. Grant, C. (1994) Delors. Inside the House that Jacques Built (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing).
138. De Grauwe, P. (2000) ‘Monetary Policies in the Presence of Asymmetries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 593-612.
139. De Grauwe, P., Dewachter, H. and Aksoy, Y. (1999) ‘The ECB Decision Rules and Macroeconomics Performance’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2067.
140. Grieco, J. M. (1995) ‘The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the neo-realist research programme’, Review of International Studies, 21, pp. 21-40.
141. Gros, D. (2003) ‘Reforming the Composition of the ECB Governing Council in view of enlargement. How not to do it!’, Briefing paper for the Monetary Committee of the European Parliament (Brussels: CEPS), February http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/econ/pdf/emu/speeches/20030217/gross.pdf.
142. Gros, D. and Hefeker, C. (2000) ‘One Size Fits All: National Divergences in a Monetary Union’, CEPS Working Paper, no. 149, July.
143. Gros, D. and Thygesen, N. (1992, 1998) European Monetary Integration, first and second edn (Harlow: Longman).
144. Haan, J. de and Eijffinger, S. C. W. (2000) ‘The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-Tales’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 393-407.
145. Haas, E. B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (London: Stevens).
146. Haas, P. (1992) ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization 46, 1, 1-35.
147. Haas, P., ed. (1997) Knowledge, power and international policy coordination (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press).
148. Hall, P. A. and Franzese, R. Jr (1998) ‘Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union’, International Organization, 52, 3, Summer, pp. 505-35.
149. Hanrieder, W. (1989) Germany, American, and Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press).
150. Hasse, R. (1990) The European Central Bank (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation).
151. Heisenberg, D. and Richmond, A. (2002) European Public Policy, 9, 2, April, pp. 201-18.
152. Heisenberg, D. (2003) ‘Cutting the Bank Down to Size: Efficient and Legitimate Decision-making in the European Central Bank After Enlargement’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 397-420.
153. Helmut S. (1988) ‘Kontinuität in den Zielen, Wandel in den Methoden’, in Wolfgang Filc, Lothar Hübl & Rüdiger Pohl, eds, Herausforderungen der Wirtshaftspolitik: Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Claus Köhler (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot).
154. Henning, C. R. (1994) Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany and Japan (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics).
155. Henning, C. R. (1997) Cooperating with Europe’s Monetary Union (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics).
156. Hirst, P. and Thompson G. (1996) Globalisation in Question (Oxford: Polity Press).
157. Hix, S. (1998) ‘The Study of the EU II: the New Governance Agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 5, 1, March, pp. 38-65.
158. Hix, S. (2000) ‘Britain, the EU and the Euro’, in Patrick Dunleavy, et al., Developments in British Politics: 6 (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
159. Hosli, M. O. (1998) ‘The EMU and International Monetary Relations: What to Expect for International Actors?’ in Carolyn Rhodes, ed., The European Union in the World Community (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press)pp. 165-91.
160. Howarth, D. (2001) The French Road to European Monetary Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave - now Palgrave Macmillan).
161. Howarth, D. (2002a) ‘EMU, Integration Theories, and the Annoying Complexities of French Policy-making’, in Amy Verdun, ed., The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield)pp. 179-201.
162. Howarth, D. (2002b) ‘French perspectives on “Economic Government”’, paper presented at the ECSA-Canada biannual conference, University of Toronto, Toronto, 30 May-1 June.
163. Howarth, D. and Loedel, P. (2004) ‘The ECB and the Stability Pact: Policeman and Judge?’ in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 840-61.
164. H. M. Treasury (1997) UK Membership of the Single Currency - an Assessment of the Five Economic Tests, (London: HMSO).
165. H. M. Treasury (1998) Outline National Changeover Plan (London: HM Treasury).
166. IMF (International Monetary Fund) (1998) ‘Report on Capital Markets’(Washington, DC: IMF) September.
167. Issing, O. (1999) ‘The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or “Willem in Euroland”’ in Journal of Common Market Studies, 37, 3, pp. 503-19.
168. Jabko, Nicolas (2003) ‘Democracy in the age of the euro’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 710-39.
169. Jones, E. (1998) ‘Economic and Monetary Union: Playing With Money’, in Andrew Moravcsik, ed., Centralization or Fragmentation? (New York: Council on Foreign Relations) pp. 59-93.
170. Jones, E. (2002) The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union: Integration and Idiosyncrasy (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield).
171. Kaltenthaler, K. (1999) ‘The Sources of European Central Bank Policy Preferences’, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999.
172. Kane, E. (1980) ‘Politics and fed policymaking’, in Journal of Monetary Economics, 6, pp. 199-211.
173. Kaufmann, H. M. (1995) ‘The Importance of Being Independent: Central Bank Independence and the European System of Central Banks’, in C. Rhodes and S. Mazey, eds, The State of the European Union. Building a European Polity?(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner) pp. 267-92.
174. Kees, A. (1987) ‘The Monetary Committee of the European Community’, Kredit und Kapital, 20, 2: 258-67.
175. Kees, A. (1994) ‘The Monetary Committee as a Promoter of European Integration’in A. Bakker, H. Boot, O. Sleipen and W. Vanthoor, eds, Monetary Stability through International Cooperation (Dordrecht: Kluwer).
176. Kenen, P. B. (1995) Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (Cambridge: CUP).
177. Kennedy, E. (1991) The Bundesbank (London: RIIA and Pinter).
178. Keohane, R. O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
179. Keohane, R. O. and Hoffman, S. (1991) ‘Institutional change in Europe in the 1980s’, in R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, eds, The new European Community Decisionmaking and institutional change (Boulder: Westview), pp. 1-39.
180. Koch, H. (1983) L’histoire de la Banque de France et de la monnaie sous la IV République (Paris: Dunod).
181. Krasner, S., ed. (1983) International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
182. Lamy, P. and Pisani-Ferry D. (2002) L’Europe de nos volontés (Paris: Plan).
183. Lehment, H. (1981) ‘Monetary Policy: Does Independence Make a Difference? -the German Experience’, Kieler Sonderdrueck 100 (Kiel: Institute fuer Weltwirtschaft Kiel).
184. Leino, P. (2001) ‘The European Central Bank and Legitimacy: Is the ECB a Modification of or an Exception to the Principle of Democracy?’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, 1/01, available at ‘http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/001101.html’.
185. Levitt, M. and Lord, C. (2000) The Political Economy of Monetary Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan-now Palgrave Macmillan).
186. Lindberg, L. N. and Scheingold, S. A. (1970) Europe’s would-be polity: patterns of change in the European Community (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall).
187. Loedel, P. (1999a) Deutsche Mark Politics: Germany in the European Monetary System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).
188. Loedel, P. (1999b) ‘The Lasting Legacy of Fifty Years of Deutsche Mark Politics’, Debatte, 7, 1 May, pp. 24-36.
189. Loedel, P. (2002) ‘Multilevel Governance and the Independence of the European Central Bank’ in Amy Verdun, ed., The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 125-44.
190. Louis, J.-V. (2000) ‘Euro spectator: implementing the euro in 1999’, Introductory report, Summary of the national reports (Florence: EUI).
191. Louis, J.-V. (2002) Euro in the national context (London: BIICL).
192. Magnette, P. (2000) ‘Towards “Accountable Independence”? Parliamentary Controls of the European Central Bank and the Rise of a New Democratic Model’ in European Law Journal, 6, 4, December, pp. 326-40.
193. Majone, G. (1996) Regulating Europe (London: Routledge).
194. Majone, G. (1999) ‘The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems’, West European Politics, 22, 1, pp. 1-24.
195. Mamou, Y. (1987) Une machine de pouvoir, la Direction du Trésor (Paris: La Découverte).
196. March, J. G. (1986) ‘Garbage Can Models of Decision Making in Organizations’, in J. G. March and R. Weissinger-Baylon, eds, Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Ambiguity Decision Making (London: Pitman), pp. 141-76.
197. March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P., eds (1982) Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, second edn.
198. Marcussen, M. (1998) ‘Central Bankers, the Ideational Life-Cycle and the Social Construction of EMU’, EUI Working Papers, RSC, No. 98/33 (Florence: European University Institute).
199. Marcussen, M. (2000) Ideas and Elites: the Social Construction of Economic and Monetary Union, Aalborg: Aalborg University Press.
200. Marks, G., Hooghe, L. and Blank, K. (1996) ‘European Integration since the 1980s: State-centric versus Multi-level Governance’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, 3, pp. 343-78.
201. Marsh, D. (1992) The Bundesbank: the Bank that Rules Europe (London: Heinemann).
202. Marshall, M. (1999) The Bank: the Birth of Europe’s Central Bank and the Rebirth of Europe’s Power (London: Random House).
203. Martin, L. (1993) ‘International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process’, Economics and Politics, 5, 2, pp. 125-43.
204. Mayes, D. G. (1998) ‘Evolving Voluntary Rules for the Operation of the European Central Bank’, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 8, 4, pp. 357-86.
205. Mayes, D. G. (2000) ‘Independence and Co-ordination - the Eurosystem’, Paper presented at the UACES 30th Anniversary Conference and 5th UACES
206. Research Conference, Central European University, Budapest 6-8 April, 2000, Panel 11.
207. McKay, D. (1999a) ‘The Political Sustainability of European Monetary Union’, British Journal of Political Science, 29, pp. 510-41.
208. McKay, D. (1999b) Federalism and European Union: a Political Economy Perspective (Oxford: OUP).
209. McKay, D. (2000) Designing Europe: Institutional Adaptation and the Federal Experience (Oxford: OUP).
210. McNamara, K. (1998) The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
211. Meade, E. and Sheets, N. (1999) ‘Regional Influences on US Monetary Policy: Some Implications for Europe’, London: Centre for Economic Performance Working Paper, http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0523.pdf.
212. Mersch, Y. (2003) ‘The reform of the Governing Council of the ECB’, Panel Statement, Central Bankers’ Panel, European Banking and Financial Forum, Prague, 25 March. Reproduced in BIS Review, 16 / 2003.
213. Moran, M. (1991) The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution (London: Macmillan - now Palgrave Macmillan). Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 4, December, pp. 473-524.
214. Moran, M. (1998) The Choice for Europe (London: UCL).
215. Le Monde The New York Times
216. Noelle-Neumann, E. (1968) Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, ‘Geldwert und öffentliche Meinung: Anmerkungen zur “Psychologie der Inflation”’, in C. A. Andreae, K. H. Hansmeyer and G. Scherhorn, Geldtheorie und Geldpolitik: zum Gustav Schmölders 65 Geburtstag (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot).
217. Oakeshott, M., ed. (1957) Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
218. O’Brien, R. (1992) Global Financial Integration: the End of Geography (London: Pinter).
219. Østrup, F. (1995) ‘Economic and Monetary Union’, CORE working paper 6/1995, (Copenhagen: CORE).
220. Overturf, S. (1997) Money and European Union (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
221. Padoa-Schioppa, T. (1994; 2000) The Road to Monetary Union in Europe (Oxford: OUP), Chapter 6, ‘The EMS is not Enough: the Need for Monetary Union’, pp. 93-110.
222. Padoa-Schioppa, T. (1999a) ‘EMU and Banking Supervision’, lecture at the London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group, 24 Feb.
223. Padoa-Schioppa, T. (1999b) ‘The external representation of the euro area’, Introductory statement at the Sub-Committee on Monetary Affairs, European Parliament, Brussels, 17 March, http://www.ecb.int/
224. Padoan, P. C. and Henning, C. R. (2000) Transatlantic Perspectives on the Euro (Washington: Brookings/Pittsburg: ECSA).
225. Patat, J. P. and Lutfalla, M (1986) Histoire monétaire de la France au XXe siècle (Paris: Economica).
226. Pierson, P. (1996) ‘The Path to European Integration; a Historical Institutionalist Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, 29, 2, pp. 123-63.
227. Plihon, D. (1994) ‘Indépendance ou autonomie de la Banque de France?’, Regards sur l’actualité, septembre-octobre, pp. 3-23.
228. Pollack, M. A. (1997) ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the European Community’, in International Organisation, 51, 1, pp. 99-134.
229. Porter, T. (1993) States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance (New York: St.Martin’s Press).
230. Posen, A. (1993) ‘Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation’, in R. O’Brien, ed., Finance and the International Economy, 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
231. Prate, A. (1987) La France et sa monnaie, Essai sur les relations entre la Banque de France et les gouvernements (Paris: Julliard).
232. Rosenthal, G. G. (1975) The men behind the decision. Cases in European policymaking, (Lexington: Lexington Books, DC).
233. Rosamond, Ben (2000) Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: Macmillan -now Palgrave Macmillan).
234. Sanchez-Santos, J. and Varela, D. (2003) ‘Representative or Independent? A Rational Choice Model of Interest Rate Decision-Making by the European Central Bank’, Paper presented at the UACES Annual Research Conference, 2-4 September, 2003, Newcastle, UK. See http://www.udc.es.rrii/ajm/papers/ECBpaper08.pdf.
235. Sandholtz, W., ‘Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht’, International Organization, 47, 1, Winter 1993, pp. 1-39.
236. Schaling, E. (1995) Institutions and monetary policy: credibility, flexibility and Central Bank independence (Aldershot: Edward Elgar).
237. Smaghi, L. B., Padoa-Schioppa, T. and Papadia, F. (1994) ‘The transition to EMU in the Maastricht Treaty’, Essays in International Finance, no. 194, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
238. Stolfi, F. (1999) ‘The Accountability of the European Central Bank: Sketching a Comparative Perspective’, paper presented at the Sixth Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association, Pittsburgh, 2-5 June, 1999.
239. Strange S. and Calleo D. (1984) Paths to International Political Economy (London: George, Allen and Unwin).
240. Taggart, P. (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research, 33, 3 April, pp. 363-88.
241. Taylor, C. (2000) ‘The Role and Status of the European Central Bank: Some Proposals for Accountability and Cooperation’, in C. Crouch, ed., After the Euro: Shaping Institutions for Governance in the Wake of European Monetary Union (Oxford: OUP), pp. 179-202.
242. Teivainen, T. (1997) ‘The Independence of the European Central Bank: Implications for Democratic Governance’, in P. Minkkinen and H. Patomaki, eds, The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union (London: Kluwer), pp. 164-206.
243. Thatcher, M. (1993) The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins).
244. Tietmeyer, H. (1999) ‘The Eurosystem’s Approach to Monetary Stability’, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln (Frankfurt: Deutsche Bundesbank) 13 April, pp. 1-6.
245. Toma E. and Toma, M., eds (1986) Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives and Monetary Policy (Boston: Kluwer).
246. Treaty on European Union (1992) Council of the European Communities/Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
247. Ungerer, Horst (1993) ‘Political Aspects of European Monetary Integration’, EUIWorking Paper, European Policy Unit, 93.2, San Domenico: EUI.
248. Verdun, A. (1996) ‘An “Asymmetrical” Economic and Monetary Union in the EU: Perceptions of Monetary Authorities and Social Partners’, Journal of European Integration, 20, pp. 59-81.
249. Verdun, A. (1998a) ‘The Institutional Design of EMU: a Democratic Deficit’, Journal of Public Policy, 18, 2: 107-32.
250. Verdun, A. (1998b) ‘The increased influence of EU monetary institutions in determining national policies, a transnational monetary elite at work’, in B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek, eds, Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations (London: Routledge).
251. Verdun, A. (1999) ‘The role of the Delors Committee in the creation of EMU: an epistemic community?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6, 2, pp. 308-28.
252. Verdun, A. (2000a) ‘Governing by Committee the Case of Monetary Policy’ in T. Christiansen and E. Kirchner, eds, Committee Governance in the European Union, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 132-44.
253. Verdun, A. (2000b) ‘Monetary Integration in Europe: Ideas and Evolution’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith, eds, The State of the European Union (Oxford: OUP), 5, 91-109.
254. Verdun, A. (2000c) European Responses to Globalization and Financial Market Integration: Perceptions of Economic and Monetary Union in Britain, France and Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan - now Palgrave Macmillan).
255. Verdun, A. and Christiansen, T. (2000) ‘Policies, Institutions and the Euro: Dilemmas of Legitimacy’, in C. Crouch, ed., After the Euro: Shaping Institutions for Governance in the Wake of European Monetary Union (Oxford: OUP), pp. 162-78.
256. Vila Maior, P. (2002) ‘The European Central Bank as the Breaking Point for the Conventional Notion of Democratic Legitimacy: a Revolution on the State-Centric Paradigm and the Innovative Path for the Future of European Integration as Polity’, paper presented at the ECSA-Canada biannual conference, University of Toronto, Toronto, 30 May-1 June.
257. Von Arnim, Hans Herbert (1988) ‘Die Deutsche Bundesbank: Pfeiler der Demokratie’, Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschaftspolitik, 37, 1, 51-63.
258. Walsh, J. I. (2000) European Monetary Integration and Domestic Politics, Britain, France and Italy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press).
259. Wessels, W. and Linsenmann, I. (2002) ‘EMU’s impact on national institutions.A gouvernement économique in the making: Towards vertical and horizontal fusion?’ in K. Dyson, The European State in the Euro-Zone (Oxford: OUP).
260. Wicks, N. (1999) ‘Will EMU Lead to European Economic Government?’, London: Centre for European Reform.
261. Wilks, S. (1996) ‘Britain in Europe: an Awkward Partner or an Awkward State?’, in Politics, 16, 3, pp. 159-65.
262. Woolley, J. (1984) Monetary Politics, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press).
263. Woolley, J. (1992) ‘Policy credibility and European monetary institutions’, in A. M. Sbragia, ed., Europolitics. Institutions and policy in the ʼnew’ European Community (Washington, DC: Brooking Institutions), pp. 157-90.
264. Wyplosz, C. (1999) ‘Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: Strategies and Institutions’, mimeo of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, presented to the Franco-German economic forum in Bonn, 12 January.
265. Zilioli, C. and Martin Selmayr (2001) The Law of the European Central Bank (Oxford: Hart).