Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition

Synthese

Volumn 195, Issue 6, 2018, Pages 2627-2648

  Gallagher, Shaun ^a,b   Allen, Micah ^c,d  

^a University of Memphis   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG   (Australia)

^c UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Active inference; Enactivism; Free energy principle; Hermeneutics; Predictive coding; Social cognition

Indexed keywords

EID: 85000351061     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8     Document Type: Article

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