Autopoiesis, free energy, and the life–mind continuity thesis

Synthese

Volumn 195, Issue 6, 2018, Pages 2519-2540

  Kirchhoff, Michael D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG   (Australia)

Author keywords

Autopoiesis; Biopsychism; Causal explanatory relations; Dark room; Free energy principle; Life mind continuity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84964534067     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1100-6     Document Type: Article

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