The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective

Synthese

Volumn 195, Issue 6, 2018, Pages 2417-2444

  Bruineberg, Jelle ^a   Kiverstein, Julian ^a   Rietveld, Erik ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Action readiness; Active inference; Affordances; Enaction; Free energy principle; Metastability; Predictive coding; Skilled intentionality

Indexed keywords

EID: 84992063453     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1     Document Type: Article

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