Experiential fantasies, prediction, and enactive minds

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 3-4, 2015, Pages 68-92

  Kirchhoff, Michael D ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG   (Australia)

^b AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Enactivism; Experience; Extended minds; Free energy; Predictive processing

Indexed keywords

EID: 84948420485     PISSN: 13558250     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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