The problem of circularity in evidence, argument, and explanation

Perspectives on Psychological Science

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 172-182

  Hahn, Ulrike ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Circular analysis; Circular arguments; Circular explanation

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051805928     PISSN: 17456916     EISSN: 17456924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1745691611400240     Document Type: Review

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