Perspectives on Preference Aggregation

Perspectives on Psychological Science

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 403-407

  Regenwetter, Michel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993746884     PISSN: 17456916     EISSN: 17456924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01146.x     Document Type: Article

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