Human capital and property rights

Handbook of Economic Organization: Integrating Economic and Organization Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 273-288

  Grandori, Anna ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84978132016     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781782548225.00025     Document Type: Chapter

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