Specific investment and corporate law

European Business Organization Law Review

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 473-500

  Blair, Margaret M ^a   Stout, Lynn A ^b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

agency costs; boards of directors; capital lock in; corporate law; law and economics; legal personality; nexus of contracts; principal agent model; residual claimants; scientific revolutions; shareholder primacy; shareholder wealth maximization; specific investment; team production; theory of the firm

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052394144     PISSN: 15667529     EISSN: 17416205     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1566752906004733     Document Type: Review

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