Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers' Preferences and Superior Governance Structures

Corporate Governance and Firm Organization: Microfoundations and Structural Forms

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages

  Grandori, Anna ^a   Soda, Giuseppe ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Governance mechanisms; Human capital; Italian firms; Multiple principals; Preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 84919634752     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269761.003.0004     Document Type: Chapter

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