Spanning the chasm: Uniting theory and empirics in microfinance research

The Handbook of Microfinance

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 59-75

  Fischer, Greg ^a   Ghatak, Maitreesh ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971278910     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1142/9789814295666_0003     Document Type: Chapter

References (40)

1. Ahlin, C (2009). Matching for Credit: Risk and Diversification in Thai Micro-Borrowing Groups. BREAD Working Paper No. 251.
2. Ahlin, C and N Jiang (2008). Can Micro-credit bring development? Journal of Development Economics, 86(1), 1–21.
3. Ahlin, C and RM Townsend (2007). Using repayment data to test across models of joint liability lending. Economic Journal, 117(517), 11–51.
4. Alexander Tedeschi, G. (2006). Here today, gone tommorrow: Can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible? Journal of Development Economics, 80(1), 84–105.
5. Aniket, K (2006). Sequential Group Lending with Moral Hazard. Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper No. 136.
6. Ariely, D and K Wertenbroch (2002). Procrastination, deadlines, and performance: Selfcontrol by precommitment. Psychological Science, 13(3), 219–224.
7. Armendariz de Aghion, B and J Morduch (2005). The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Aubert, C, A de Janvry, and E Sadoulet (2009). Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions. Journal of Development Economics, 90(1), 153–162.
9. Banerjee, A (2005). New development economics and the challenge to theory. Economic and Political Weekly, 40(4), 4340–4344.
10. Banerjee, AV, T Besley, and TW Guinnane (1994). Thy neighbor’s keeper: The design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 491–515.
11. Basu, K (2008). The Provision of Commitment in Informal Banking Markets: Implications for Takeup and Welfare. University of Chicago mimeograph.
12. Bauer, M, J Chytilova, and J Morduch (2008). Behavioral foundations of microcredit: Experimental and survey evidence. Institute for Economic Studies mimeograph.
13. Besley, T and S Coate (1995). Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral. Journal of Development Economics, 46(1), 1–18.
14. Bond, P and AS Rai (2009). Borrower runs. Journal of Development Economics, 88(2), 185–191.
15. Chowdhury, PR (2005). Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability. Journal of Development Economics, 77(2), 415–439.
16. Chowdhury, PR and Ray, J (2009). Public-private partnerships in micro-finance: Should NGO involvement be restricted? Journal of Development Economics, 90(2), 200–208.
17. Collins, D, J Morduch, S Rutherford, and O Ruthven (2009). Portfolios of the poor: How the world’s poor live on $2 a day. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Consultative Group to Assit the Poorest (2002). Microfinance Consensus Guidelines. Developing Deposit Services For The Poor. Washington, D.C.: CGAP/The World Bank.
18. Duflo, E (2006). Field experiments in development economics. In: Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications: Ninth World Congress. Cambridge University Press.
19. Field, E and R Pande (2008). Repayment frequency and default in microfinance: Evidence from india. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2–3), 501–509.
20. Fischer, G (2010). Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice. LSE mimeo.
21. Fischer, G and M Ghatak (2010). Repayment frequency and lending contracts with present-biased borrowers. LSE mimeo.
22. Gangopadhyay, S, M Ghatak, and R Lensink (2005). Joint liability lending and the peer selection effect. Economic Journal, 115(506), 1005–1015.
23. Ghatak, M (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1), 27–50.
24. Ghatak, M (2000). Screening by the company you keep: Joint liability lending and the peer selection effect. Economic Journal, 110(465), 601–631.
25. Ghatak, Mand, TW Guinnane (1999). The economics of lending with joint liability: Theory and practice. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1), 195–228.
26. Gine, X and DS Karlan (2009). Group Versus Individual Liability: Long-Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups. Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 61
27. Gonzalez-Vega, C, S Navajas, and M Schreiner (1995). A Primer on Bolivian Experiences in Microfinance: An Ohio State Perspective. Ohio State University.
28. Guttman, JM, (2008). Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending. Journal of Development Economics, 87(1), 51–56.
29. Jain, S and G Mansuri (2003). A little at a time: The use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs. Journal of Development Economics, 72(1), 253–279.
30. Karlan, D and J Zinman (2009). Observing unobervables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment. Econometrica, 77(6), 1993–2008.
31. Laffont, J-J (2003). Collusion and group lending with adverse selection. Journal of Development Economics, 70(2), 329–348.
32. McIntosh, C (2008). Estimating treatment effects from spatial policy experiments: An application to Ugandan Microfinance. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(1), 15–28.
33. McIntosh, C and B Wydick (2002). Competition and microfinance. University of California, Berkeley mimeo.
34. Rai, AS and T Sjostrom (2004). Is Grameen lending efficient? Repayment incentives and insurance in village economies. Review of Economic Studies, 71(1), 217–234.
35. Sadoulet, L (1999). Equilibrium risk-matching in group lending. ECARES/Universite Libre de Bruxelles mimeo.
36. Stiglitz, JE (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets. World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), 351–366.
37. Varian, HR (1990). Monitoring agents with other agents. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1), 153–174.
38. Westley, GD (2004). A tale of four village banking programs: Best practices in Latin America. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.
39. Wydick, B (1999). Can social cohesion be harnessed to repair market failures? Evidence from group lending in Guatemala. Economic Journal, 109(457), 463–475.
40. Yunus, M and A Jolis (2003). Banker to the poor: Micro-lending and the battle aganist world poverty. New York: Public Affairs.