Collusion and group lending with adverse selection

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 329-348

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Collusion; Development; Group lending

Indexed keywords

BANKING; CREDIT PROVISION; LENDING BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0037729031     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(02)00100-1     Document Type: Article

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