Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 51-56

  Guttman, Joel M ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Assortative matching; Group lending; Microcredit; Microfinance

Indexed keywords

LENDING BEHAVIOR; MICROECONOMICS; MICROFINANCE; MODELING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 43449136759     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.06.002     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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3. Ghatak M., and Guinnane T.W. The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice. Journal of Development Economics 60 (1999) 195-228
4. Guttman J.M. Repayment performance in group lending programs: a survey. Working Paper 2006-WP-01 (2006), Networks Financial Institute, Indianapolis, IN
5. Laffont J.-J., and N'Guessan T. Group lending with adverse selection. European Economic Review 44 (2000) 773-784
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7. van Tassel E. Group lending under asymmetric information. Journal of Development Economics 60 (1999) 3-25