Borrower runs

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 185-191

  Bond, Philip ^a   Rai, Ashok S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b WILLIAMS COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Contagion; Microfinance; Repayment incentives

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; DEVELOPING WORLD; DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; INCENTIVE; LENDING BEHAVIOR; MICROFINANCE;

EID: 56349170661     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.005     Document Type: Article

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