Mechanisms to Induce Buyer Forecasting: Do Suppliers Always Benefit from Better Forecasting?

Production and Operations Management

Volumn 24, Issue 11, 2015, Pages 1724-1749

  Amornpetchkul, Thunyarat ^a   Duenyas, Izak ^b   Şahin, Özge ^c  

^a NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION   (Thailand)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

demand forecasting; information sharing; supply chain contracting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84955354944     PISSN: 10591478     EISSN: 19375956     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/poms.12355     Document Type: Article

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