Performance-Based Incentives in a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model

Manufacturing and Service Operations Management

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 240-263

  Plambeck, Erica L ^a   Zenios, Stefanos A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Dynamic Principal Agent Problem; Incentives In Operations Management; Maintenance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008577265     PISSN: 15234614     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/msom.2.3.240.12345     Document Type: Article

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