Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information

Management Science

Volumn 52, Issue 8, 2006, Pages 1238-1257

  Özer, Özalp ^a   Wei, Wei ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b MORGAN STANLEY   (United States)

Author keywords

Advance purchase; Asymmetric information; Capacity reservation; Coordination; Forecast; Game theory; Payback; Screening; Signaling; Supply contracts

Indexed keywords

ADVANCE PURCHASE; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; CAPACITY RESERVATION; COORDINATION; PAYBACK; SUPPLY CONTRACTS;

FORECASTING; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL ANALYSIS; RISK ASSESSMENT; SCREENING; SIGNALING;

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT;

EID: 33748296107     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0521     Document Type: Article

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