Defectors Can Create Conditions That Rescue Cooperation

PLoS Computational Biology

Volumn 11, Issue 12, 2015, Pages

  Waite, Adam James ^a,b   Cannistra, Caroline ^b   Shou, Wenying ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POPULATION STATISTICS; STOCHASTIC MODELS; STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

CONDITION; COOPERATION BASED; COOPERATOR FREQUENCIES; INDIVIDUAL-BASED; LOCAL POPULATIONS; MOST LIKELY; POPULATION SIZES; RESOURCE LIMITATIONS; SMALL POPULATION; STRUCTURED POPULATION;

LOCATION;

ARTICLE; BIRTH RATE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR; EVOLUTIONARY ADAPTATION; GENE MUTATION; GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION; LIFE EVENT; MIGRATION; MORTALITY; POPULATION SIZE; STOCHASTIC MODEL; SURVIVAL RATE; ALTRUISM; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; ECOSYSTEM; EVOLUTION; GAME; GENETICS; MUTATION; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION GENETICS; REPRODUCTIVE FITNESS; STATISTICAL MODEL;

ALTRUISM; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; ECOSYSTEM; GAME THEORY; GENETIC FITNESS; GENETICS, POPULATION; MODELS, GENETIC; MODELS, STATISTICAL; MUTATION; POPULATION DENSITY;

EID: 84953235940     PISSN: 1553734X     EISSN: 15537358     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004645     Document Type: Article

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