Judgment and decision making

Handbook of Cognition

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 321-339

  McKenzie, Craig R M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84950969536     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4135/9781848608177.n14     Document Type: Chapter

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