Personal identity and buddhist philosophy: Empty persons

Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 1-232

  Siderits, Mark ^a  

^a Seoul National University   (South Korea)

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EID: 84946412363     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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